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Abstract 
Existing literature argues that taking a holistic 
approach to disaster management is important for 
organizations in achieving resilience. However, 
theoretical underpinnings are lacking to achieve a 
holistic understanding. This paper applies the notion of 
an ecosystem as a holistic lens to understand complex 
disaster management.  
We report two case studies from Japan and Nepal 
to illustrate how an ecosystem works during a disaster. 
The Japan case is a government initiative, whereas the 
Nepal case is a non-governmental initiative. The 
theoretical framework of information ecology is used 
in analyzing the cases.  
Based on the findings, we formulate three 
propositions that show important elements of 
ecosystems to approach resilience. The study suggests 
that coevolution is a key to respond to constantly 
changing situations during a disaster. To accomplish 
ecosystem coevolution, creating a collaboration system 
with governments and local communities and 
embedding local knowledge into the system are 
essential. Furthermore, digital tools can play a critical 
role in the coevolution process. 
 
1. An ecosystem as a means to achieve 
resilience  
 
In a crisis situation, international and national 
organizations and individuals from local communities 
play an important role in providing response and 
recovery. When we consider effective disaster 
management, looking at each organization separately is 
not enough, but having a holistic approach [1] is 
important [2, 3]. Resilience, which refers to the 
capabilities of absorbing disturbances [4], is a purpose 
that disaster relief organizations should achieve in 
disaster management.  
This paper provides a holistic lens to understand 
how an organization achieves resilience in a disaster 
situation through collaboration with external 
organizations. We pay attention to collaboration 
because collaboration among various players in the 
field is important during catastrophic events, as it 
reduces the complexity of the events [5, 6]. To 
understand its complexity, the social ecology theory 
[7] and the actor-network theory [8] are applied. 
However, these theories look into social aspects or 
network formation process and provide little 
understanding on the process of adaptation [9].  
We apply the notion of an ecosystem [10, 11] to 
guide us to a holistic understanding of disaster 
management. Resilience theory envisions ecosystems 
as constantly changing and reorganizing processes [12]. 
In this sense, during a disaster, we should consider 
organizations not as stable states [13], but as entities 
that coevolve to adapt to a particular situation through 
change and reorganization processes.  
This paper presents two different cases from Japan 
and Nepal to explore an effective ecosystem in disaster 
management. For this purpose, we use an information 
ecology framework. We derived the framework from 
the literature [14], in which the authors define 
information ecology as “a system of people, practices, 
values, and technologies in a particular local 
environment” (Page 49). The concept of information 
ecology particularly focuses on human activities that 
are served by technology while the social ecology 
framework does not have information in its center.    
Based on an information ecology perspective, the 
case analysis shows how key actors collaborate within 
an ecosystem during a disaster situation, particularly 
reveals how the actors organize through information 
sharing among related organizations. In the Japan case, 
the main focus is on the role of the local government, 
as it is the agency closest to the residents and has 
knowledge of the residents and resources in the area 
[15]. The Nepal case, on the other hand, focuses on the 
role of digital and local communities in addressing the 
disaster-related challenges. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: 
(1) a description of information ecology, (2) data 
collection and analysis, (3) a case description and 
analysis, (4) discussion, and (5) conclusion. 
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2. Information ecology framework  
Information ecology is considered a complex 
system of parts and relationships. It 
exhibits diversity and experiences continual evolution. 
Different parts of ecology coevolve, changing together 
according to the relationships in the system. 
Several keystone species are necessary for the survival 
of the ecology. In addition, information ecologies have 
a sense of locality. The key elements of information 
ecology summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1. Key elements of information ecology 
[derived from ref. [14]] 
Key 
Elements 
Description 
System Strong interrelationships and 
dependencies developing among 
different parts and taking different 
forms. 
Diversity Different kinds of people, ideas, 
technologies and tools that work 
together in a complementary way. 
Coevolution Capability of adapting to new 
constraints and possibilities, which, in 
turn, lead to further change. 
Information ecologies evolve as new 
ideas, tools and activities, and new 
forms of expertise rise up within 
them. 
Keystone 
species 
The presence of keystone species is 
crucial to the survival of the ecology 
itself, e.g., skilled people whose 
presence is necessary to support the 
effective use of technology. 
Locality  Local settings or attributes that give 
people the meaning of the ecology. 
 
1) System 
Like a biological ecology, information ecology is 
marked by strong interrelationships and dependencies 
among its different parts. The parts of information 
ecology may differ from each other. 
2) Diversity 
In information ecology, there are different kinds of 
people and tools. In a well-functioning information 
ecology, they work together in a complementary way. 
3) Coevolution 
A well-functioning ecology is not static, even when 
it is in equilibrium. Similar dynamics are at work in 
evolving information ecologies. The pace of new 
technology development ensures that school, work, and 
home settings will continue to be offered newer, faster, 
and different tools and services—not just once, but 
repeatedly. Information ecologies evolve as new ideas, 
tools, activities, and forms of expertise arise in them. 
This means that people must be prepared to participate 
in the ongoing development of their information 
ecologies.  
4) Keystone Species 
Ecology is marked by the presence of certain 
keystone species whose presence is crucial to the 
survival of the ecology itself. 
5) Locality 
The habitation of a local context is its location 
within a network of relationships. To whom does it 
belong? To what and to whom is it connected? 
Through what relations? The habitation of a local 
context is its set of family ties in the local information 
ecology.  
By applying the information ecology framework, 
we explore how the ecosystem in the cases of Japan 
and Nepal worked. Though the literature reflects 
different views of resilience, this paper takes the path 
of providing capabilities of absorbing disturbances and 
allows for ongoing, proactive development; i.e., a 
dynamic, adaptive interplay between sustaining and 
evolving processes in response to change [16-20]. In 
this sense, we see how each key element of 
information ecology framework interacts with the 
others, informing us of how such a capability is given 
to relief organizations.  
Before moving to the case analyses, we present the 
approach to data collection in the next section. 
 
3. Data collection and analysis 
 
The largest earthquake on record occurred on the 
east coast of Japan on March 11, 2011. The earthquake, 
called the Great East Japan Earthquake, was recorded 
at a magnitude of 9 on the Richter scale and caused 
massive damage to a very wide area of the country. 
This earthquake is unique in that it caused a rupture 
zone 500 km long and produced a tsunami of 40 
meters. The Fire and Disaster Management Agency 
reported 19,418 deaths, 6,220 injuries, and 2,592 
missing as of March 2016. It also reported 121,800 
houses entirely lost and more than 1,000,000 partially 
destroyed. The east coast of Japan has been known as 
being prone to earthquakes, so local authorities 
practiced exercises and residents were well prepared; 
however, the scale of the earthquake was beyond any 
prior assumptions and caused devastating damage, 
especially to the northeast coastal area of Japan. 
Five months after the earthquake, in August of 
2011, one of the authors conducted a field survey in an 
inland city called Tono to investigate the damage and 
situation. Although five months had passed since the 
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earthquake, residents of the most damaged places 
around the coast area were still in a state of panic, so 
conducting a field survey was impossible. Tono was 
affected by the earthquake; however, the damage level 
was less pronounced than in the coastal area. A two-
hour face-to-face interview has been conducted with 
the mayor and two officials in the disaster management 
headquarters. The interview was open-ended but main 
focus was how they supported neighboring towns 
where were heavily damaged. The interview was 
recorded and transcribed. Following the administration 
of the survey, a presentation given by the same 
officials at Tono in July 2012, one year after the 
interview, about their activities of a base for supply 
and rescue operations to the damaged area was used as 
supplementary data. 
On April 25th, 2015, a 7.8 magnitude earthquake 
hit Nepal, which caused widespread damage across 14 
districts out of 75 in the whole country. On the same 
day, a powerful aftershock of 6.9 magnitude hit again. 
More than 8,000 people died, and more than 21,000 
people were injured. Four out of the seven UNESCO 
World Heritage sites in Nepal were severely damaged 
in the earthquake. Amidst this chaos and panic, 
Kathmandu Living Lab (KLL) started communicating, 
enrolling, and mobilizing community people and 
digital humanitarians all around the world to respond 
to the earthquake.  
One of the authors visited Nepal to conduct a field 
study in December of 2015. The detailed narratives 
from the director of the KLL, who had been directly 
involved in the whole crisis response process, as well 
as a log book of KLL’s skype conversation with 
different actors were analyzed. In addition to this 
conversation analysis, we also conducted interviews 
with locals from Kathmandu (the capital city of Nepal), 
volunteers from OpenStreetMap (OSM), which is a 
collaborative project to create a free editable map of 
the world [21], and the standby task force that was 
directly involved in the Nepal earthquake event. We 
also talked to the community members from Timal 
village near Kathmandu and conducted an in-depth 
interview with a senior researcher (from a private 
social science research institute) who is currently doing 
case studies in Sindhupalchowk (one of the most 
affected areas). Additionally, we also had an informal 
discussion with KLL staff members. In total around 20 
interviews were conducted. The interview lasts from 
30 minutes to 60 minutes. All the interviews were 
audio recorded and transcribed. We also took detail 
notes of the interviews and discussions. 
Most of the interviews were open-ended and 
conducted on site. In the interview, we try to acquire a 
broader understanding of the phenomena, such as who 
was involved, how different actors responded, how the 
event change their socioeconomic behavior, what kinds 
of digital technologies were used and so on. Some 
additional interviews with the locals of Kathmandu and 
nearby villages provided a broader contextual picture 
of the crisis situation in Nepal. The primary data, such 
as interviews, were supplemented by adding secondary 
data, such as news articles, government documents on 
earthquake response, and research articles on KLL.   
In analyzing the data, we went through the 
interview transcripts and extracted the main constructs 
and mapped those constructs to the five elements of the 
information ecology framework. The analysis revealed 
the intricacies of crisis management ecosystem. 
Throughout the analysis, constant data comparison was 
conducted to enable holistic understanding of the five 
elements of information ecology. 
 
4. Case description and analysis  
 
In this section, two case studies from the Great East 
Japan Earthquake in Japan and the 7.8 magnitude 
earthquake in Nepal are presented. These two cases 
differ in nature. The Japan case is initiated by the local 
government in Tono, whereas the Nepal case is 
initiated by local communities (KLL). So the analysis 
will highlight how the ecosystem in each case formed 
and evolved.  
 
4.1. The case of Tono City in Japan 
One man ran into the disaster response 
headquarters in Tono on midnight of March 11, 2011. 
Eleven hours before that, at 14:42 on the same day, the 
Great East Japan Earthquake hit the east coast of Japan. 
The man came from a neighboring town called Otsuchi 
where more than half of the town land had been 
flooded and washed away by the tsunami. Since roads 
were destroyed by the earthquake and tsunami, the man 
climbed up a mountain on his foot and found the 
headquarters in Tono. He said,  
“500 people evacuated to the Otsuchi high school. 
Water and foods are running out. Please give us a 
help.” 
From this moment, Tono became an important base 
for supply and rescue operations to the heavily 
damaged coast area. Three hours after the man’s arrival, 
officials of a fire brigade started heading to Otsuchi 
bringing food, water, fuel, and blankets. 
Tono is an inland city located in Iwate prefecture 
(regional government) where its coast areas were one 
of the most damaged by the earthquake. The mayor 
had been thinking that Tono should be a base for 
supporting the coastal areas at the time of a disaster. 
Since Tono is 50km away from the coastline, the 
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mayor views the geographical condition as an 
advantage. 
In 2007, four years before the earthquake, a 
regional disaster preparedness exercise of providing 
medical supports and delivering relief was conducted 
in Tono. The number of participants was 87 
organizations from the Iwate region. This exercise 
resulted in formulating a neighboring municipalities 
networking association with the purpose of 
collaborating and supporting each other at the time of a 
disaster. Nine towns, including Tono, joined this 
association. At this moment, Tono foresaw that the 
following functions would be necessary to fulfill its 
mission as an effective base for relief supply and 
rescue operations in the time of a disaster: 
1) Open the municipal park as a temporary 
heliport for external organizations providing 
relief operations in the initial response phase 
such as the Red Cross or army forces. 
2) Using empty land in the town as a parking 
space and a campground. 
3) Transferring serious casualties from damaged 
areas to inland medical facilities. 
4) Providing facilities for storing and managing 
relief goods (medicine, blankets, water servers, 
and so on). 
5) Providing open space for external 
organizations to have meetings and for other 
purposes. 
Based on the above assumptions, a disaster exercise 
with the purpose of supporting damaged areas was 
conducted again in 2008. More than 18,000 people 
from 25 neighboring towns, police, a fire brigade, and 
army forces participated in the one-day event. 
The earthquake hit this area three years later. At 
15:00 on March 11 in 2011, just 20 minutes after the 
earthquake, Tono opened a base for external 
supporting organizations in a municipal park in spite of 
the fact the earthquake inflicted much damage upon 
Tono itself to its government buildings. Ten days after 
the earthquake, the number of people who aggregated 
in Tono for the purpose of supporting the damaged 
area was more than 3,500. As of June of 2012, one 
year and three months after the earthquake, Tono 
received 6,400 packs of rice (10 kg for one pack), 
128,000 bottles of water (two liters for each bottle), 
178,000 set of clothes and blankets, and 166,000 boxes 
of food from 44 municipalities all over the country. 
Moreover, 13 organizations, including three 
universities, set up their bases in Tono as support 
offices. 
In addition to providing facilities to external 
organizations, Tono itself was sending officials to 
neighboring damaged towns to collect situational 
information and deliver requested goods. The number 
of dispatches was more than 300 for the first six 
months after the earthquake. Dispatched officials 
delivered relief goods and returned back to Tono with 
requests from the damaged area. Since information and 
communication technology (ICT) was damaged, 
officials were the only way to collect and deliver 
information. They simply repeated information 
collection and relief goods delivery. The disaster 
exercises in 2007 and 2008 helped smooth actions in 
the initial response phase; however, the exercise did 
not assume the delivery of relief operations for such a 
long time. It was beyond the scope of the exercise. 
Decisions were made by the mayor based on the 
constantly changing situation with constant 
improvisations. Other local governments offered their 
experience and knowledge to Tono on how to deal with 
the situation. It helped Tono a great deal. 
The failure of ICT, especially in terms of a blackout, 
is what Tono city did not predict when conducting the 
exercises. Until the power supply resumed two days 
after the earthquake, a radio broadcasting accessible by 
a radio-charged battery was the only way to grasp the 
situation. If the man from Otsuchi town had not come 
into the disaster headquarters office, Tono would not 
have known how devastating the situation was in 
Otsuchi. Officials sent to the damaged areas were the 
means to having knowledge of the situation; however, 
it took some time to go back and forth so the 
information was not always current. Since the situation 
in the area was changing all the time, getting real-time 
information was critical for mobilizing relief 
operations. The mayor of Tono recalled the situation 
and said the following: 
“For several weeks after the earthquake, every 
supportive organization was in a state of panic, and 
information received from them was sometimes 
incorrect. Reports from officials we sent to the 
damaged area were the most reliable information 
sources. However, I believe that since army forces or 
police should have known the situation in the towns in 
the coastal area better than us, we would have been 
able to mobilize relief operations more quickly if we 
had been given the situational information on heavily 
damaged area.” 
Since all organizations, i.e., Tono as a local 
government, Iwate as a regional government and police, 
a fire brigade and army forces as external organizations, 
were conducting relief operations separately, 
information was not shared among them. Tono was 
forced to collect related information on their own. In 
the heavily damaged area, sending requests outside 
town was impossible because damaged municipalities 
lost all communication channels, including the power 
supply. Only human beings could deliver information 
and ask for help. 
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4.2. Analysis of the Japan case 
We organize our findings around key elements of 
information ecology, which are shown in Table 1. The 
focus is to understand how the ecosystem worked in 
Tono during the earthquake and what the challenges 
were.  
4.2.1 System 
“System” aims at building interrelationships among 
different parts of information ecology. The mayor of 
Tono has been aware of the importance of organizing a 
collaborative platform in case the coastal area is 
destroyed by the disaster. The regional disaster 
exercise was conducted in 2007 with 87 organizations 
from the area. One year later, the extended exercise 
took place in the same manner, with neighboring towns, 
police, a fire brigade, and army forces.  
Emergency management has been categorized into 
four components: mitigation, preparedness, response, 
and recovery [22-24]. The exercise mainly focused on 
preparedness and response phases. The scope of 
responses in this exercise was not long-term, but rather 
short-tem, namely the initial response [25] phase. In 
reality, during the earthquake, disaster management 
operations lasted for more than one year, and this was 
beyond prior assumptions. 
4.2.2 Diversity 
The literature points out nurturing “diversity” is 
one of the critical factors in building resilience in 
social ecological systems [12]. Different kinds of 
organizations participated in the regional disaster 
exercises. Through the exercises, they shared 
procedures on how to react to a disaster in the initial 
response phase; however, tools or information systems 
were developed separately for each organization. In 
addition, note that the exercise succeeded in creating a 
collaborative platform among public organizations, but 
failed to involve local residents or communities, and 
voluntary associations. 
4.2.3 Coevolution 
 “Coevolution” involves generating new ideas, 
tools, or activities. The first regional exercise resulted 
in formulating a networking organization of nine 
neighboring towns in Tono. In this sense, the 
networking association is one form of coevolution. The 
learning process is a key mechanism for the evolution 
in social ecological systems [26]. As the case shows, 
since the earthquake was quite large and beyond prior 
assumptions, disaster management operations were 
prolonged for several months and years. The exercise 
focused on the short-term response, and Tono did not 
possess knowledge on how to deal with the prolonged 
situation. Another regional government in Shizuoka 
prefecture located 700 km away from Tono provided 
knowhow on how to deal with the situation, as it was 
not affected by the earthquake. Shizuoka prefecture has 
gained knowledge through its experience since the 
Shizuoka region covers the central east coast of Japan 
and is prone to earthquakes. The officials in Tono 
recalled the situation and said the following: 
 
“The knowledge provided by Shizuoka enabled us 
to develop our own procedure for acting as a relief 
supply and rescue base operator for such a long time.” 
 
4.2.4 Keystone species 
In this case, Tono plays a critical role in 
configuring an ecosystem with “keystone species.” The 
basic functions that Tono provided to external relief 
organizations were opening their land for multiple 
purposes, such as a heliport, a transportation hub for 
injured persons, medicine and other relief goods, and 
meetings. In addition, lodges were offered by local 
communities. At the end of March, 2011, the social 
welfare councils of Tono organized networks of 
individuals and voluntary associations. They prepared 
to receive volunteers from all over the country and 
matched needs from the damaged area and skills of 
volunteers. The social welfare councils and citizen 
volunteers made more than 140 thousand rice balls that 
were delivered to the affected towns. Tono is important 
not only in its geographical conditions, but also in its 
capability to aggregate related individuals and 
associations together, although these associations were 
not included in the exercise. 
4.2.5 Locality 
Communication tools such as landline, mobile 
phones, and the Internet were useless because the 
power supply was cut down. The only means to collect 
“local” information was city officials. However, in this 
case, the local context had not been shared among 
related organizations, even if the power supply would 
have continued. Since the long-term disaster operations 
were out of the exercise scope, the common tools for 
supporting information sharing were not developed in 
advance. Each organization collected information 
separately. Difficulty in information sharing was the 
biggest challenge for Tono in providing supply and 
rescue base services. The exercise succeed in 
cultivating initial response procedures as domain 
knowledge [27], while it did not cover a longer 
response phase, which requires local contexts to keep 
track of what happened and what was needed. 
 
4.3. The case of KLL 
      KLL 1  is an active and growing technology 
community established in 2013 to improve urban 
planning and management. The community is 
comprised of software start-ups, tech incubators, 
                                                 
1
 http://www.kathmandulivinglabs.org/ 
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universities, and the local OSM chapter including 
mapping volunteers from all around the world. With 
the motto of “together we can do more,” KLL 
harnesses local knowledge, develops open data, and 
promotes civic technologies.  
      On April 25
th
, 2015, a 7.8 magnitude earthquake hit 
Nepal, which caused widespread damage across 14 
districts. Amidst this chaos and panic, KLL people 
started brainstorming how to respond to the 
earthquake. The next day, KLL established a room for 
the headquarters for its earthquake response in a 
parking area because the office was damaged. The 
headquarters office explained KLL’s actions in the 
relief effort and how others could help. The director of 
KLL was aware that this work could not be done alone 
and locally; therefore, he contacted the Digital 
Humanitarian team that evening. The Digital 
Humanitarian team is a volunteer network, including 
the standby task force [21], to seek help from the 
international OSM community. This network is unique 
in using digital tools to respond to a crisis situation.  
     KLL received an unprecedented response from 
volunteer mappers. Within 48 hours after the 
earthquake, over 1,500 people begin to remotely map 
the affected area in OSM using aerial imagery. To 
speed up their response program, they deployed 
QuakeMap volunteers. The purpose was to bridge the 
information gap between the quake victims and relief 
agencies.  
     KLL coordinated with and engaged mappers 
throughout the world using online chat platforms, such 
as Skype.  Meanwhile, the demand for maps and data 
was growing. Individuals, volunteer groups, and 
humanitarian organizations began to request data and 
printable maps for relief operations from KLL. Around 
2,200 volunteers have contributed through remote 
mapping. In the course of extending their services, 
KLL established contact with the GIS division of the 
Nepal army. KLL received requests to map camps of 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) who are displaced 
due to the earthquake. To handle this problem, KLL 
asked volunteer mappers to assist in locating IDP 
camps with aerial imagery. KLL also provided a 
training session to doctors who were involved in the 
relief operations. KLL members trained the doctors in 
how to use OSM and QuakeMap to determine where 
their help was needed. At this point, 3,300 mappers 
have assisted in mapping in OSM. To meet the need 
for digital data and printable maps of the affected 
districts, KLL introduced QuakeRelief, a repository of 
printable maps that used the data mapping that 
volunteers have added to OSM Nepal.  
     Within a month of operation, The New York Times 
reported on KLL's earthquake response efforts. The 
news further helped in spreading the word about what 
KLL was doing. This was the first time KLL’s work 
appeared in major international news media after the 
earthquake. The international news pulled the attention 
of the Nepal government, which consequently 
recognized KLL’s work.  
     On May 1
st
, 2015, the National Information 
Technology Center (NITC), which facilitates ICT-
enabled delivery of all government services in Nepal, 
listed QuakeMap on its website as an important part of 
the local earthquake response initiative. KLL also 
began working with UNESCO and the Department of 
Archeology to document the condition of cultural 
heritage sites in the Kathmandu Valley. KLL 
developed a mobile data collection app and held a 
training course to show volunteers how to report the 
conditions of sites in the mobile app.  
On May 12, 2015, an aftershock of 7.3 magnitude 
further damaged the affected districts, serving as a 
strong reminder of the importance of both recovering 
from disasters and preparing for future natural 
disasters. The aftershock made KLL’s office too 
dangerous to enter; therefore, the office moved to 
another temporary location in a building at 
Kasthamandap School. At this point, QuakeMap 
continued to be a vital tool in the earthquake response 
with 1,500 reports about the needs from victims and 
relief efforts. Volunteers analyzed and classified the 
reports and followed up the reports until they were 
resolved. In the aftermath, on May 18, a landslide 
blocked a river called Kali Gandaki, highlighting a 
need for continued mapping. The blockage created a 
temporary dam, which led to massive flooding 
upstream of the dam.  
     On May 24, KLL moved to a new. On July 7, the 
Department of Education, Central Bureau of Statistics 
(CBS), and The World Bank collaborated with KLL to 
support an assessment of damage to schools in affected 
zones. KLL’s expertise in mobile data collection 
technology made the collaboration possible. Similarly, 
KLL and international academic institutions jointly 
held a workshop to discuss the role of data and 
technology in the relief efforts following the 
earthquake in April. Along with Kathmandu University 
and UAViators (unmanned aerial vehicle), KLL co-
organized a workshop on using Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAVs), or drones, for humanitarian work. 
The high-quality aerial imagery that UAVs collect can 
be used for assessing damage and planning 
reconstruction. After its successful completion of the 
response program, KLL closed QuakeMap.org. They 
currently moved their focus to the recovery phase. 
KLL is involved in the work of school infrastructure 
damage assessment. The updated OSM data—created 
by the work of 9,000 volunteers from around the 
world-—continues to serve as an important resource. 
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KLL is working continually in enrolling new actors 
and mobilizing the actors into other crisis management 
activities, such as housing damage assessment. The 
assessment uses mobile data collection to assess 
housing damage through all earthquake-affected 
districts. 
 
4.4. Analysis of the KLL case 
     Based on the five key elements of information 
ecology, we have identified various entities of KLL 
Nepal, their interaction with various players, and their 
coevolution. These are elaborated upon below as 
follows.  
4.4.1  System 
     In the KLL case, a structured system, such as the 
regional exercise flame, does not exist; however, as 
introduced in the previous section, KLL consists of 
several organizations. KLL is not just one organization 
or individual, but rather a network hub of digital 
humanitarians (standby taskforce), OSM mappers, 
local communities, doctors, national and international 
(remote) volunteers, the Nepal army, and government 
organizations. KLL was founded by a social 
entrepreneur with the purpose of implementing mobile 
and internet-based technology solutions for open 
government and civic innovation to enhance urban 
resilience and civic engagement. KLL has since grown 
into an active technology community established to 
improve urban planning and management. They now 
deal with identifying the usage of technologies in 
solving complex problems, such as response and 
recovery in emergency circumstances. As we can see, 
interdependencies among various players have been 
embedded in the system of KLL from its origin. 
4.4.2 Diversity 
     In the KLL case, each player had a clear role. The 
role of the digital humanitarian team was to map and 
cluster the data, the Nepal army was focusing on 
sending the personnel to affected areas, aid agencies 
wanted to send their resources, and doctors were 
volunteering to provide medical facilities. The local 
communities were also working collectively to find out 
about the victims, and the role of KLL was to 
coordinate between all these actors and analyze the 
huge amount of data. In contrast to the Japan case, the 
KLL network did not include governmental 
organization in their first attempts. 
4.4.3 Coevolution 
     Information ecology is not static. It is constantly 
evolving [14]. Similar dynamics can be seen in the 
case of KLL. Digital tools, such as chat rooms, 
mapping tools, email systems, UAVs, GPS systems, 
and social media, served as mediators in carrying out 
the rescue operations. In fact, without these 
technologies, it was quite difficult to get the real-time 
location of the victims and to conduct the measurement 
of the hazards. 
     These development efforts resulted in collaborative 
works with KLL and the international/governmental 
organization such as the Department of Education in 
Nepal, CBS, and the World Bank to create new 
services (damage assessment works) in the affected 
areas. 
4.4.4 Keystone species  
     In the KLL case, KLL, digital humanitarians such 
as the standby taskforce, OSM, Nepal Army, and aid 
agencies, including government organizations, were 
essential. However, KLL in this context as a keystone 
species coordinates organizational collaboration as 
well as thousands of international mappers. 
4.4.5 Locality 
     Locality is a particularly important attribute of 
information ecologies. Only people who are immersed 
in a particular information ecology can provide a local 
habitation and a name for new technologies [14]. For 
instance, in this case the main actor was KLL, which 
has a greater understanding of the local context and 
their socio-geographical configuration, and thus, the 
local communities and local governments, which have 
a better understanding of local needs, and legitimacy 
compare to outside interventionist. KLL developed 
OSM, QuakeMap, and other digital tools, which helped 
KLL to gather the local context into the map. 
 
5. Discussion  
 
The notion of resilience enhances the capacity of  
social ecological systems to adapt to uncertainty and 
surprise [28]. The purpose of this paper is to explore 
the way to achieve resilience from an ecosystem 
perspective. Two cases from Japan and Nepal are 
analyzed based on the information ecology framework. 
The findings are summarized in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Key elements of information ecology in 
Japan and Nepal 
 Tono (Japan) KLL (Nepal) 
System The regional 
disaster exercises 
KLL (software 
start-ups, tech 
incubators, 
universities, local 
OSM chapter) 
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Diversity Tono city, 
neighboring 
towns, police, a 
fire brigade, army 
forces, local 
communities, 
volunteers  
Digital 
humanitarian 
team, Nepal army, 
doctors, local 
communities 
Coevolution A networking 
association of 
neighboring 
towns, knowledge 
share from 
Shizuoka 
prefecture 
OSM, QuakeMap, 
chat rooms 
Collaboration 
with the 
Department of 
Education, CBS, 
and the World 
Bank 
Keystone 
species 
Tono city, the 
social welfare 
councils 
KLL 
Locality Tono city 
officials 
KLL, local 
communities, 
local governments 
 
     The Japan case has effectively been operationalized 
by the government organizations, whereas participation 
from local communities as well as digital communities 
was not strongly embedded in the ecosystem. This 
results in lack of information sharing and prevents 
effective disaster management.  
     In the Nepal case, the use of digital tools and the 
involvement of digital communities, such as digital 
humanitarians and mapping communities, were visible 
while the collaboration for information sharing 
between government organizations was lacking. For 
example, in the beginning, the government 
organizations and aid agencies were skeptical about 
using KLL’s mapping information. They attempted to 
use their own authentic channel. This might have 
hindered the KLL’s crisis response team; however, the 
recognition of real-time mapping through 
crowdsourcing by various national and international 
media and digital humanitarian communities helped 
KLL to convince government and aid agencies. 
Consequently, these agencies also enrolled in the KLL 
crisis response team. Although there has been 
collaboration regarding the use of digital mapping, less 
efforts have been made by the government to apply the 
channels in practice. Hence, the distribution of relief 
goods was not effective. 
Based on the findings, we introduce three 
propositions for an effectively functioning ecosystem 
in disaster management.  
 
Proposition 1: A government initiative is essential to 
formulate a structured system with diverse players. 
 
The regional disaster exercises in Tono provided a 
geographical foundation of collaboration during the 
Great East Japan Earthquake. Tono was a hub to pass 
relief goods offered by 44 municipalities around Japan 
to the damaged area. However, the exercise was only 
open to government organizations, such as army forces, 
a fire brigade, police, and so on. After the earthquake, 
local communities, such as voluntary associations, 
were organized with the initiative taken by the Tono 
social welfare councils. Local communities including 
volunteers were organized flexibility in a self-
organized [29, 30] manner under the initiative of Tono.  
Looking at the case of KLL, they formed structured 
relationships among different players in the local 
community, except the government organizations. As a 
result, KLL succeeded in collecting situational 
information on OSM and other digital tools. However, 
they did not have the capability to mobilize relief 
goods distribution, while government organizations 
have this. It took some time until KLL was 
acknowledged by them as a reliable aid agency to 
cooperate. When governmental organizations join the 
platform, they require social trust to judge the 
reliability of the platform. KLL acknowledged social 
trust, mainly as reported by national/international 
media.   
In summary, the literature pointed out the 
importance of diversity of a social ecological system 
[12], however, the information ecology framework 
does not suggest how diverse actors collaborate to 
formulate a structured system. In our analysis, we find 
the importance of the government initiative especially 
in a crisis management situation that managing relief 
goods operations become critical. Forms of such a 
structured system vary, i.e., exercises, a collaborating 
network, and so on. Efforts to involve local 
communities should be made in the preparedness phase 
to mobilize an effective ecosystem in the time of the 
event. 
 
Proposition 2: Gathering local knowledge is essential 
for promoting the coevolution of the ecosystem. 
 
In the information ecology framework, the 
importance of five elements was not characterized. 
Through our case analysis, we find that coevolution is 
the most important element for a functioning 
ecosystem in disaster management, as disaster 
management is unique in responding to constantly 
changing situations. Damages and demands differ 
place by place, which makes disaster management 
complicated and unpredictable. An ecosystem should 
learn and evolve through the entire response phase.  
Coevolution embeds leaning features in its process 
[26]. Shizuoka provided knowledge to Tono on how to 
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react to the prolonged disaster situation, which helped 
Tono to adapt to an unexpected situation. A 
networking organization of nine neighboring 
municipalities generated an opportunity to obtain relief 
goods from 44 municipalities. Local knowledge 
enabled Tono to learn and applied a new form of relief 
supply and rescue operations.  
More than several thousand volunteers helped to 
collect local knowledge in Nepal. KLL’s actions were 
visible through chat rooms, allowing volunteers to 
understand what they were doing and going to do. 
QuakeMap, developed by KLL through crowdsourcing, 
especially involving digital humanitarian and local 
communities, solved the information gap Tono was 
facing, that is, the gap between the needs of affected 
areas and relief organizations. Tono succeeded in 
formalizing a public organization’s network as well as 
involving local communities subsequently; however, 
they failed to acquire the proper information from the 
field. As a result, the ecosystem stopped coevolving. 
On the other hand, KLL’s various attempts to gather 
local knowledge and connect those to actual relief 
activities enhanced further collaboration with the 
Department of Education, CBS, and the World Bank. 
All the actors started to believe in KLL mapping and 
make it standard locating tools rather than paper-based 
traditional maps; then, they started moving toward 
using digital tools for mapping crisis situations.  
In summary, coevolution is necessary to respond to 
constantly changing disaster situations. Coevolution in 
both cases can be observed as the result of sharing 
local knowledge. In this sense, locality can generate 
domain knowledge. The degree to which local 
knowledge is gathered affects ecosystem performance 
and further disaster management operations. 
 
Proposition 3: Execution of digital tools by keystone 
species can enhance local knowledge sharing and 
enable effective relief operations. 
 
As a result of understanding importance of local 
knowledge share, a question that arises is: How should 
local knowledge be shared? Since no digital tools were 
embedded in the ecosystem in Tono, city officials were 
the only means to collect local information. Tono’s 
initiative enabled diverse players to gather, but tools 
for information collection were developed separately. 
This forced Tono to take much more time to obtain 
real-time information than usual, while QuakeMap 
received more than 1,500 reports from victims and 
relief efforts within 48 hours after the earthquake. The 
KLL case is unique in that the development of digital 
tools emerged corresponding to the situation. They did 
not prepare any tools in advance; however, starting 
with OSM, QuakeMap bridged disaster victims’ 
demand and relief agencies. Around 9,000 volunteers 
from all over the world contributed to creating OSM 
remotely. Following these tools, QuakeRelief as a 
repository of printable maps and several mobile data 
collection apps for reporting field conditions were 
chronologically developed. The literature points out the 
importance of improvisation in response [31] and 
intuitive procedures for disasters [5, 6]. This is a future 
topic that can be studied to explore why KLL succeed 
in improvising their response by developing several 
new communication tools during the earthquake. 
In summary, it is apparent that execution of these 
digital tools by keystone species can enhanced local 
knowledge gathering; however, at the same time we 
recognize that integration of the tools are necessary 
and it is impossible to prepare all the appropriate tools 
before an event. Tools should be developed 
corresponding to a situation that is changing all the 
time. What local governments can do is maintain their 
connection to communities that are capable of 
developing such digital tools.  
 
6. Conclusion 
  
This paper reports two cases from Japan and Nepal 
to establish a holistic approach to disaster management. 
A theoretical lens of an ecosystem and the information 
ecology framework are applied to the case analyses. 
Three propositions that guide us in further 
understanding how an ecosystem works are presented.    
From an ecological perspective, the mutual 
dependency between diverse players and the 
coevolution process should function in a proper way. 
By looking at the interrelationships of each element in 
information ecology, we can gain insight into how an 
ecosystem works [32]. 
The propositions show the importance of 
governmental initiatives to involve several players and 
maintain an ecosystem’s diversity. Even if engagement 
is accomplished in a self-organized way, the 
government plays an important role in delivering relief 
operations (especially the distribution of relief goods). 
Coevolution is the key element in a functioning 
ecosystem, but we should take into account the local 
context [33]. In this sense, gathering local knowledge 
is essential for promoting coevolution. Digital tools 
support local knowledge sharing, but they are 
developed in the field. 
While the results are only from two cases, at the 
same time, we believe these findings can contribute to 
the research by providing the means for how an 
organization achieves resilience. In addition, the 
propositions suggest how to make disaster 
management systems sustainable and effective. We 
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believe these findings can be applied in solving real 
problems in practice. 
 
7. References  
 
 
[1] B.W. Ritchie, Chaos, crises and disasters: a strategic 
approach to crisis management in the tourism industry, 
Tourism Management, 25(6) 2004, pp. 669-683. 
[2] H. Baharmand, K. Boersma, K. Meesters, F. Mulder, J. 
Wolbers, A multidisciplinary perspective on supporting 
community disaster resilience in Nepal, in:  Information 
Systems for Crisis Response and Management, Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil, 2016. 
[3] R. Soden, N. Budhathoki, L. Palen, Resilience-Building 
and the Crisis Informatics Agenda: Lessons Learned from 
Open Cities Kathmandu, in:  Information Systems for 
Crisis Response and Management, Pennsylvania, USA, 
2014. 
[4] C.S. Holling, Resilience and Stability of Ecological 
Systems, Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, 4(1) 
1973, pp. 1-23. 
[5] C. Perrow, The Organizational Context of Human 
Factors Engineering, Administrative Science Quarterly, 
28(4) 1983, pp. 521-541. 
[6] C. Perrow, Normal accidents: Living with high-risk 
technologies, Basic Books, NY, 1984. 
[7] W.G. Astley, C.J. Fombrun, Collective Strategy: Social 
Ecology of Organizational Environments, The Academy of 
Management Review, 8(4) 1983, pp. 576-587. 
[8] J. Sabou, S. Videlov, An analysis on the role of trust in 
digital humanitarian actor networks, in:  Information 
Systems for Crisis Response and Management, Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil, 2016. 
[9] D.J. Wood, B. Gray, Toward a Comprehensive Theory 
of Collaboration, The Journal of Applied Behavioral 
Science, 27(2) 1991, pp. 139-162. 
[10] J.F. Moore, The Death of Competition: Leadership & 
Strategy in the Age of Business Ecosystems, Harper 
Collins, NY, USA, 1996. 
[11] M.E. Porter, M.R. Kramer, CREATING SHARED 
VALUE, Harvard Business Review, 89(1/2) 2011, pp. 62-
77. 
[12] F. Berkes, Understanding uncertainty and reducing 
vulnerability: Lessons from resilience thinking, Natural 
Hazards, 41(2) 2007, pp. 283-295. 
[13] C.S. Holling, From Complex Regions to Complex 
Worlds, Ecology and Society, 9(1) 2004. 
[14] B.A. Nardi, V. O'Day, Information Ecologies Using 
Technology with Heart, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, USA, 
1999. 
[15] M. Sakurai, R.T. Watson, C. Abraham, J. Kokuryo, 
Sustaining life during the early stages of disaster relief with 
a frugal information system: learning from the great east 
Japan earthquake, Communications Magazine, IEEE, 52(1) 
2014, pp. 176-185. 
[16] J.M. Anderies, M.A. Janssen, E. Ostrom, A framework 
to analyze the robustness of social-ecological systems from 
an institutional perspective, Ecology and Society, 9(1) 
2004, pp. [online] URL: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol9/iss1/art18/. 
[17] F. Berkes, J. Colding, C. Folke, Navigating social-
ecological systems : building resilience for complexity and 
change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003. 
[18] L.H. Gunderson, Managing surprising ecosystems in 
southern Florida, Ecological Economics, 37(2001, pp. 371–
378. 
[19] D.D. Woods, Four concepts for resilience and the 
implications for the future of resilience engineering, 
Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 141(2015, pp. 5-
9. 
[20] A. Zolli, A.M. Healy, Resilience: Why Things Bounce 
Back, Simon & Schuster, City of New York, NY., 2013. 
[21] P. Meier, Digital humanitarians: how big data is 
changing the face of humanitarian response, CRC Press, 
Boca Raton, FL, USA, 2015. 
[22] D. McLoughlin, A Framework for Integrated 
Emergency Management, Public Administration Review, 
45(Special) 1985, pp. 165-172. 
[23] A.K. Settle, Financing Disaster Mitigation, 
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery, Public 
Administration Review, 45(Special) 1985, pp. 101-106. 
[24] K.I. Shoaf, S.J. Rottman, The Role of Public Health in 
Disaster Preparedness, Mitigation, Response, and 
Recovery, Prehospital and Disaster Medicine, 15(04) 2000, 
pp. 18-20. 
[25] M. Sakurai, J. Kokuryo, Design of a Resilient 
Information System   for Disaster Response, in:  35th 
International Conference on Information Systems, 
Auckland, Newzealand, 2014. 
[26] S. Carpenter, B. Walker, M.J. Anderies, N. Abel, From 
Metaphor to Measurement: Resilience of What to What?, 
Ecosystems, 4(8) 2001, pp. 765-781. 
[27] G.B. Davis, M.H. Olson, Management information 
systems : conceptual foundations, structure, and 
development, 2nd ed., McGraw-Hill, New York, 1985. 
[28] W.N. Adger, T.P. Hughes, C. Folke, S.R. Carpenter, J. 
Rockström, Social-ecological resilience to coastal disasters, 
Science, 309(5737) 2005, pp. 1036-1039. 
[29] L.K. Comfort, Self-Organization in Complex Systems, 
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory: J-
PART, 4(3) 1994, pp. 393-410. 
[30] S.A. Kauffman, The Origins of Order: Self-
Organization and Selection in Evolution, Oxford University 
Press, U.S.A., 1993. 
[31] D. Mendonça, Decision support for improvisation in 
response to extreme events: Learning from the response to 
the 2001 World Trade Center attack, Decision Support 
Systems, 43(3) 2007, pp. 952-967. 
[32] D. Thapa, M.K. Sein, Information Ecology as a 
Holistic Lens to Understand ICTD Initiatives: A Case 
Study of OLPC Deployment In Nepal, in: International 
Conference on Information & Communication 
Technologies and Development Michigan, USA, 2016. 
[33] M. Warschauer, M. Ames, CAN ONE LAPTOP PER 
CHILD SAVE THE WORLD'S POOR?, Journal of 
International Affairs, 64(1) 2010, pp. 33-51. 
 
2488
